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The Law of Implicit Bias
∗

**

Christine Jolls and Cass R. Sunstein

Abstract
Considerable attention has been given to the Implicit Association Test (IAT), which finds that most people have an
implicit and unconscious bias against members of traditionally disadvantaged groups. Implicit bias poses a special challenge for antidiscrimination law because it
suggests the possibility that people are treating others differently even when they are unaware that they are doing so.
Some aspects of current law operate, whether intentionally
or not, as controls on implicit bias; it is possible to imagine
other efforts in that vein. An underlying suggestion is that
implicit bias might be controlled through a general strategy of “debiasing through law.”

∗

Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School
and Department of Political Science, University of Chicago. For
helpful discussions and suggestions on implicit bias and
antidiscrimination law, we thank Ian Ayres, Richard Banks, Elizabeth
Bartholet, Bert Huang, Alison Morantz, Eric Posner, Frederick
Schauer, Reva Siegel, Peter Siegelman, Matthew Stephenson, Adrian
Vermeule, and participants at workshops at Boston University School
of Law, Columbia Law School, Fordham Law School, Harvard Law
School, Stanford Law School, and Yale Law School. Martin Kurzweil
provided outstanding research assistance.
**

1

Consider two pairs of problems:
1A. A regulatory agency is deciding whether to impose new restrictions on cloning mammals for use as food. Most people within the
agency believe that the issue is an exceedingly difficult one, but in the
end they support the restrictions on the basis of a study suggesting that
cloned mammals are likely to prove unhealthy for human consumption. The study turns out to be based on palpable errors.
1B. A regulatory agency is deciding whether to impose new restrictions on cloning mammals for use as food. Most people within the
agency believe that the issue is an exceedingly difficult one, but in the
end they support the restrictions on the basis of a “gut feeling” that
cloned mammals are likely to be unhealthy to eat. It turns out that the
“gut feeling,” spurred by a widely publicized event appearing to establish serious risk, is impossible to support by reference to evidence.
2A. An employer is deciding whether to promote Jones or Smith
to a supervisory position at its firm. Jones is white; Smith is AfricanAmerican. The employer thinks that both employees are excellent, but
it chooses Jones on the ground that employees and customers will be
“more comfortable” with a white employee in the supervisory position.
2B. An employer is deciding whether to promote Jones or Smith
to a supervisory position at its firm. Jones is white; Smith is AfricanAmerican. The employer thinks that both employees are excellent, but
it chooses Jones on the basis of a “gut feeling” that Jones would be
better for the job. The employer is not able to explain the basis for this
gut feeling; it simply thinks that “Jones is a better fit.” The employer
did not consciously think about racial issues in making this decision;
but, in fact, Smith would have been chosen if both candidates had been
white.
In case 1A, the agency is violating standard principles of administrative law. Its decision lacks a “rational connection between facts and
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judgment”1 and, thus, is most unlikely to survive judicial review. In
case 1B, the agency is in at least equal difficulty; administrative
choices must receive support from relevant scientific evidence.2
The second pair of cases is analytically parallel. Case 2A involves
a conscious and deliberative judgment that clearly runs afoul of antidiscrimination law.3 Case 2B might well seem equally troublesome.
But in fact it is not at all clear that Smith would be able to prevail in
case 2B, at least if there is no general pattern of race-based decisionmaking by the employer. Smith will face a burden of proof that will be
hard to surmount on the facts as stated.4 And note that these conclusions apply even if the employer is (parallel to cases 1A and 1B) a
government rather than a private actor; the administrative law and
antidiscrimination law regimes treat “gut feelings” in quite different
ways.
Case 2B is far from unrealistic in today’s world, as the present
Symposium makes clear. A growing body of evidence, summarized by
Anthony Greenwald and Linda Hamilton Krieger,5 suggests that the
real world is probably full of such cases of “implicit,” or unconscious,
bias. This is likely to be true not only with respect to race, but also
with respect to many other traits.6

1

See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 56 (1983).
2
Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
3
See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial
Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79
GEO. L.J. 1619, 1623 (1991).
4
See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1995).
5
See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit
Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).
6
See id.
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Much evidence of these forms of implicit bias comes from the
Implicit Association Test (IAT), which has been taken by large and
diverse populations on the Internet and elsewhere.7 The IAT asks individuals to perform the seemingly straightforward task of categorizing a
series of words or pictures into groups. Two of the groups are racial or
other categories, such as “black” and “white,” and two of the groups
are the categories “pleasant” and “unpleasant.” In the version of the
IAT designed to test for implicit racial bias, respondents are asked to
press one key on the computer for either “black” or “unpleasant”
words or pictures and a different key for either “white” or “pleasant”
words or pictures (a stereotype-consistent pairing); in a separate round
of the test, respondents are asked to press one key on the computer for
either “black” or “pleasant” words or pictures and a different key for
either “white” or “unpleasant” words or pictures (a stereotypeinconsistent pairing). Implicit bias against African-Americans is defined as faster responses when the “black” and “unpleasant” categories
are paired than when the “black” and “pleasant” categories are paired.
The IAT is rooted in the very simple hypothesis that people will find it
easier to associate pleasant words with white faces and names than
with African-American faces and names—and that the same pattern
will be found for other traditionally disadvantaged groups.
In fact, implicit bias as measured by the IAT has proven to be extremely widespread. Most people tend to prefer white to AfricanAmerican, young to old, and heterosexual to gay.8 Strikingly, members
of traditionally disadvantaged groups tend to show the same set of
preferences. The only major exception is that African-Americans
themselves are divided in their preferences; half show a preference for
African-Americans, while half show the opposite preference. Note,
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See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald, Debbie E. McGhee & Jordan
L.K. Schwartz, Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit
Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1464 (1998); Brian A. Nosek, Mahzarin R. Banaji &
Anthony G. Greenwald, Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and
Beliefs from a Demonstration Website, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS 101
(2002).
8
See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 5.
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however, that unlike whites, African-Americans taken as a whole
show no preference for members of their own group.9
It might not be so disturbing to find implicit bias in experimental
settings if the results did not predict actual behavior, and in fact the
relationship between IAT scores and behavior remains an active area
of research.10 But we know enough to know that some of the time,
those who demonstrate implicit bias also manifest this bias in various
forms of actual behavior. For example, there is strong evidence that
scores on the IAT and similar tests are correlated with third parties’
ratings of the degree of general friendliness individuals show to members of another race.11 More particularly, “larger IAT effect scores predicted greater speaking time, more smiling, [and] more
extemporaneous social comments” in interactions with whites as compared to African-Americans.12 And it is reasonable to speculate that
such uneasy interactions are associated with biased behavior. In the
employment context in particular, even informal differences in treatment may have significant effects on employment outcomes, particularly in today’s fluid workplaces.13 If this is so, then the importance to

9

See id.
See, e.g., Alexander Green, Dana Carney & Mahzarin R. Banaji,
Measuring Physicians’ Implicit Biases: A New Approach To Studying
Root Causes of Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Health Care (working
paper, 2005); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich,
& Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious Bias Affect Trial Judges?
(working paper, 2005).
11
See John F. Dovidio, Kerry Kawakami & Samuel L. Gaertner,
Implicit and Explicit Prejudice and Interracial Interaction, 82 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 62, 66 (2002); Allen R. McConnell
& Jill M. Leibold, Relations Among the Implicit Association Test,
Discriminatory Behavior, and Explicit Measures of Racial Attitudes,
37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 435, 439-40 (2001). For further
discussion, see Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 5.
12
McConnell & Leibold, supra note 11, at 439.
13
See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace
Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment
Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 99-108 (2003).
10
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legal policy is clear. If people are treated differently, and worse, because of their race or another protected trait, then the principle of antidiscrimination has been violated, even if the source of the differential
treatment is implicit rather than conscious bias.
It should not be controversial to suggest that in formulating and
interpreting legal rules, legislatures and courts should pay close attention to the best available evidence about people’s actual behavior—an
approach this Symposium terms “behavioral realism.”14 Indeed, the
influence of economic analysis of law stems largely from its careful
emphasis on the behavioral effects of legal rules. The need to attend to
good evidence, applied to the domain of civil rights, animates the work
in this Symposium. In much the same spirit, work in behavioral law
and economics has argued in favor of incorporating psychological insights about people’s actual behavior across a range of domains.15 We
believe that there are productive links among all behavioral approaches to law, and one of the goals of our discussion below is to call
attention to some of those links. We devote special attention to the
promise of “debiasing” actors through legal strategies that are designed to counteract biases of various sorts across a variety of domains.
Our discussion below comes in three parts. Part I explores two
systems of cognitive operations—roughly, “intuitive” and “deliberative”—with the suggestion that the distinction between the two helps
to illuminate legal responses to a wide range of behavioral problems,

14

For an in-depth discussion of “behavioral realism,” see Linda
Hamilton Krieger & Susan Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94
CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).
15
See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471
(1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and
Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The
“New” Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and
Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739 (2000).
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including those raised by the IAT. Part II investigates the possibility of
using the law to “debias” people in order to reduce implicit bias; we
develop several illustrations of such debiasing, as well as relating the
general approach of debiasing both to work that follows in this Symposium and to work elsewhere in the legal literature. Part III investigates some of the normative issues that are raised when regulators
attempt to respond, through “debiasing” or otherwise, to implicit bias.
I.
System I and System II
Implicit bias of the sort manifested on the IAT has not generally
been grouped with the “heuristics and biases” uncovered by research
in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics.16 Thus far, the reception within law of the two areas of research has been largely independent. But we believe that legal responses to implicit bias are
illuminatingly analyzed in terms that bring such bias in direct contact
with cognitive psychology and behavioral economics. Most important,
implicit bias—like many of the heuristics and biases emphasized elsewhere—tends to have an automatic character, in a way that bears importantly on its relationship to legal prohibitions.
In cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, much attention has been devoted to heuristics, which are mental shortcuts or rules
of thumb that function well in many settings but lead to systematic errors in others.17 Consider, for instance, the well-known finding by
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman involving people’s judgments

16

On heuristics and biases, see generally HEURISTICS AND BIASES:
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al.
eds., 2002) [hereinafter HEURISTICS AND BIASES]; JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al.
eds., 1982) [hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY].
17
For general discussion of heuristics, see Daniel Kahneman &
Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution
in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 16, at
49-50.
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about a thirty-one-year-old woman, Linda, who was concerned with
issues of social justice and discrimination in college. People tend to
say that Linda was more likely to be a “bank teller and active in the
feminist movement” than to be a “bank teller.”18 This judgment is patently illogical, for a superset cannot be smaller than a set within it. The
source of the mistake is the representativeness heuristic, by which
events are seen to be more likely if they “look like” certain causes.19 In
the Linda case, the use of the representativeness heuristic leads to a
mistake of elementary logic—the conclusion that characteristics X and
Y are more likely to be present than characteristic X.
Research in cognitive psychology emphasizes that heuristics of
this kind frequently work through a process of “attribute substitution,”
in which people answer a hard question by substituting an easier one.20
For instance, people might resolve a question of probability not by investigating statistics, but by asking whether a relevant incident comes
easily to mind.21 The same process is familiar in many contexts. Confronted with a difficult problem in constitutional law, people might
respond by asking about the views of trusted specialists—as, for example, through the use of (say) the “Justice Scalia heuristic,” by which
some people might answer the difficult problem by following the
views of Justice Scalia.
Often, of course, people deliberately choose to use a heuristic,
believing that it will enable them to reach accurate results. But some
of the most important heuristics have been connected to “dual process”
approaches, which have recently received considerable attention in the
psychology literature.22 According to such approaches, people employ
two cognitive systems. System I is rapid, intuitive, and error-prone;

18

Id. at 62.
See id. at 49-50.
20
See id. at 53.
21
See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic
for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207,
208 (1973).
22
See generally DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999).
19
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System II is more deliberative, calculative, slower, and often more
likely to be error-free.23 Much heuristic-based thinking is rooted in
System I, but it may be overridden, under certain conditions, by System II.24 Thus, for example, some people might make a rapid, intuitive
judgment that a large German shepherd is likely to be vicious, but this
judgment might be overcome after the dog’s owner assures them that
the dog is actually quite friendly. Most people would be reluctant to
drink from a glass recently occupied by a cockroach; but it is possible
(though far from certain) that they would be willing to do so after considering a reliable assurance that, because the cockroach had been sterilized by heat, the glass was not contaminated.25 In a context of greater
relevance to law, heuristic-driven fears about eating cloned animals or
genetically modified food might be overcome on the basis of careful
studies suggesting that the risk of harm is quite low.26 Risk-related
judgments are often founded in System I,27 and System II sometimes
supplies a corrective. In other cases, however, responses within the
System I domain itself may supply correctives, as discussed at some
length in Parts II and III below.
We believe that the problem of implicit bias is best understood in
light of existing analyses of System I processes. Implicit bias is largely
automatic; the characteristic in question (skin color, age, sexual orientation) operates so quickly, in the relevant tests, that people have no
time to deliberate. It is for this reason that people are often surprised to
find that they show the implicit bias. Indeed, many people say in good
faith that they are fully committed to an antidiscrimination principle

23

A qualification is that a bad deliberative process might, of course,
produce more errors than rapid intuitions.
24
See Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 17, at 51.
25
See Paul Rozin, Technological Stigma: Some Perspectives from
the Study of Contagion, in RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA:
UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC CHALLENGES TO MODERN SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY 31, 32 (James Flynn et al. eds., 2001).
26
See id.
27
See the discussion of fear in JOSEPH LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL
BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS UNDERPINNINGS OF EMOTIONAL LIFE
(1996).
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on the very ground on which they show a bias.28 When people exhibit
bias toward African-Americans, System II may of course be involved,
as in case 2A above, but in a great many cases System I is the culprit.
In case 2B above, the employer has no conscious awareness of the role
race played in its decision to hire Jones over Smith; in fact, the employer might regard its decision as a “mistake,” either factually or
morally, if it were aware of the role race played.
In responding to implicit bias understood in this way, the legal
system could emphasize System II; perhaps the law could produce or
encourage a System II override of the System I impulse. But it is also
possible that interventions within the domain of System I itself would
be more efficacious—although perhaps raising distinctive normative
objections. We explore these possibilities in the next two Parts.29

28

See, e.g., Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1474-

75.
29

The legal literature on implicit bias is by now enormous. Recent
work emphasizing the IAT in particular includes IAN AYRES,
PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND
GENDER DISCRIMINATION 419-25 (2001); Mijha Butcher, Using
Mediation To Remedy Civil Rights Violations When the Defendant Is
Not an Intentional Perpetrator, 24 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 225,
238-40 (2003); Mary Anne Case, Developing a Taste for Not Being
Discriminated Against, 55 STAN L. REV. 2273, 2290-91 (2003);
Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes
of Death Penalty Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539, 1542-56 (2004);
Blake D. Morant, The Relevance of Gender Bias Studies, 58 WASH. &
L. REV. 1073, 1080 n.35 (2001); Lateef Mtima, The Road to the
Bench: Not Even Good (Subliminal) Intentions, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 135, 155-58 (2001); Marc. R. Poirier, Is Cognitive Bias
at Work a Dangerous Condition on Land?, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y
J. 459, 489-91 (2003); Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and SelfCritical Analysis: The Case for a Qualified Evidentiary Equal
Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV. 913, 959-64
(1999); Evan R. Seamone, Judicial Mindfulness, 70 U. CIN. L. REV.
1023, 1051 n.144 (2002); Michael S. Shin, Redressing Wounds:
Finding a Legal Framework to Remedy Racial Disparities in Medical
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II.
Antidiscrimination Law and “Debiasing”
From the standpoint of a legal system that seeks to forbid differential treatment based on race and other protected traits, implicit bias
presents obvious difficulties. In many cases entirely unaware of their
bias and how it shapes their behavior, people will frequently fail to
override their System I inclinations. Ordinary antidiscrimination law
will often face grave difficulties in ferreting out implicit bias even
when this bias produces unequal treatment.30
Of course, antidiscrimination law has long forbidden various
forms of differential treatment on the basis of race and other protected
traits. If, for example, a state official treats someone worse because of
race, there might well be a violation of the Constitution as well as
antidiscrimination statutes. Some of the hardest cases present problems
of proof: if there is no “smoking gun,” how can bias be established?
There are also vexing conceptual questions. What, exactly, does the
category of unlawful “discrimination” include?31 However the hardest
questions are resolved, it seems clear that when System I is producing
differential treatment, the legal system will often encounter unusually
serious difficulties.
The parallels described above between implicit bias and the heuristics and biases emphasized by cognitive psychology and behavioral
economics help to illuminate the primary approaches the law can
adopt in response to unequal treatment stemming from implicit bias. In
the domain of heuristics and biases, the law has now-familiar methods

Care, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 2047, 2066-68 (2002); Megan Sullaway,
Psychological Perspectives on Hate Crime Laws, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 250, 256 (2004); and Joan C. Williams, The Social
Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science to Litigate Gender
Discrimination Cases and Defang the “Cluelessness” Defense, 7
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 401, 446-47 (2003).
30
See sources cited infra note 42.
31
See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming
of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (1989).
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with which to respond.32 In the context of “hindsight bias,” for example, the law protects against error by broadly restricting adjudicators’
ability to reconsider decisions from the perspective of hindsight.33
Likewise, in the area of consumer behavior, many people believe that
consumers show unrealistic optimism in evaluating potential product
dangers, and the law may respond by imposing a range of restrictions
on their choices.34 These approaches attempt to insulate outcomes from
the problems created by heuristics and biases, which themselves are
taken as a given. Such insulating strategies are readily imaginable in
the antidiscrimination law domain, as explored in Part II.A below.
Social scientists have also focused substantial attention on the
possibility of debiasing in response to heuristics and biases.35 The law
might engage in such debiasing as well, seeking to reduce people’s
level of bias rather than to insulate outcomes from its effects.36 If, for
instance, consumers suffer from unrealistic optimism, then regulators
might respond not by banning certain transactions or otherwise restricting consumer choice but instead by working directly on the underlying mistake.37 They might, for example, enlist the availability
heuristic, according to which people estimate the likelihood of events
based on how easily they can imagine or recall examples of such
events. Drawing on availability, regulators might then offer concrete
examples of harm in order to help consumers understand risks more
accurately. In the domain of smoking, an emphasis on specific instances of harm does appear to increase people’s estimates of the like-

32

See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law,
35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 199-201 (2006).
33
See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of
Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 619-23 (1998).
34
See, e.g., Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 207-08.
35
The seminal work is Baruch Fischhoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 16, at 422.
36
See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 200-01.
37
See id. at 209-16.
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lihood of harm.38 Attention to strategies for what we have elsewhere
termed “debiasing through law” can help both to understand and to
improve the legal system.39 Note that many of these strategies—
including the example just given of harnessing the availability heuristic—reflect System I rather System II responses to System I problems.
Debiasing strategies may also be applied in the domain of antidiscrimination law. We offer a series of illustrations—as well as relating
the general approach of debiasing to work in this Symposium and
elsewhere in the legal literature—in Parts II.B. and II.C below.
A. Insulation
When people show bias on the basis of race or another protected
trait, the most conventional legal response is to attempt to insulate outcomes from the effects of such bias. Because, for instance, certain
forms of employment behavior are unlawful under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,40 people will face monetary and other liability for engaging in such behavior. The desire to avoid such liability
should, on the traditional view, deter the prohibited behavior. The
point is particularly obvious with respect to consciously biased behavior of the sort at issue in case 2A above. There is no question that such
behavior is squarely prohibited by antidiscrimination law, and—
because the behavior is conscious—actors can be expected to respond
to legal incentives not to engage in it, at least if people care enough
about complying with the law (or at least if the penalties are stiff
enough for those who are deterred only by actual sanctions). With respect to conscious bias, existing law attempts not to “debias” people—
by reducing their conscious bias on the basis of race or another protected trait (although this may be a longer-term effect of the law)—but
to insulate outcomes from the effects of such bias.41

38

See FRANK A. SLOAN, V. KERRY SMITH, & DONALD H. TAYLOR,
JR., THE SMOKING PUZZLE: INFORMATION, RISK PERCEPTION, AND
CHOICE 157-79 (2003).
39
See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 202, 206-24.
40
42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e17 (2000).
41
Linda Hamilton Krieger nicely summarizes this effect of existing
antidiscrimination law:
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A central problem in today’s world, however, is the possibility
that many people act in response to implicit bias. In response, legal
rules might seek to reduce the likelihood that implicit bias will produce differential outcomes; but it would be quite difficult to conclude
that current antidiscrimination law adequately achieves this goal.42 As

[On the traditional view], if an employee’s protected
group status is playing a role in an employer’s
decisionmaking process, the employer will be aware of
that role . . . . Equipped with conscious self-awareness,
well-intentioned employers become capable of
complying with the law’s proscriptive injunction not to
discriminate. They will monitor their decisionmaking
processes and prevent prohibited factors from affecting
their judgments.
Krieger, supra note 4, at 1167.
42
The scholarly literature critiquing existing antidiscrimination law,
both constitutional and statutory, for its general failure to address the
problem of implicit bias is voluminous. See, e.g., Samuel R.
Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination
Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (“Unconscious bias,
interacting with today’s ‘boundaryless workplace,’ generates
inequalities that our current antidiscrimination law is not well
equipped to solve.”) (citation omitted); Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a
Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking,
104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2018-30 (1995) (concluding that existing
employment discrimination law would not provide relief for an
employee who was disadvantaged by the implicit use of criteria that
are more strongly associated with whites than nonwhites); Barbara J.
Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and
the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 958
(1993) (stating that existing Equal Protection Clause doctrine
“perfectly reflects” whites’ failure to “scrutinize the whiteness of
facially neutral norms”); Green, supra note 13, at 111 (“[E]xisting
Title VII doctrine . . . is ill-equipped to address the forms of
discrimination that derive from organizational structure and
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institutional practice in the modern workplace”); Krieger, supra note
4, at 1164 (arguing that the way in which employment discrimination
law “constructs discrimination, while sufficient to address the
deliberate discrimination prevalent in an earlier age, is inadequate to
address the subtle, often unconscious forms of bias” prevalent today);
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323
(1987) (stating that existing Equal Protection Clause doctrine “ignores
much of what we understand about how the human mind works” and
“disregards . . . the profound effect that the history of American race
relations has had on the individual and collective unconscious”); R.A.
Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in
Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 878 (2004) (recognizing the
“limitations inherent in the Supreme Court’s current approach to racial
stigma” under the Equal Protection Clause); Ian F. Haney López,
Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial
Discrimination, 109 YALE L. J. 1717, 1830-43 (2000) (describing the
gap between subtle forms of discriminatory conduct and current Equal
Protection Clause doctrine); David B. Oppenheimer, Negligent
Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 972 (1992) (stating that while
“much employment discrimination” results from unintentional
behavior, “the courts have looked at employment discrimination as a
problem of conscious, intentional wrong-doing”); Antony Page,
Batson’s Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory
Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 179-80 (2005) (arguing that existing
Equal Protection Clause doctrine in the context of peremptory
challenges to jurors fails to respond in an effective manner to
implicitly biased behavior); Poirier, supra note 29, at 459-63
(criticizing, in light of evidence of implicitly biased behavior, the
focus of employment discrimination law on various forms of
intentional misconduct); Reshma M. Saujani, “The Implicit
Association Test”: A Measure of Unconscious Racism in Legislative
Decision-Making, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 395, 413 (2003) (asserting
that existing Equal Protection Clause doctrine is “incapable of rooting
out racial discrimination where it is most pernicious”); Reva Siegel,
Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1137 (1997)
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Linda Hamilton Krieger and Susan Fiske illustrate in their contribution
to this Symposium, recent trends in antidiscrimination law seem to
leave much implicitly biased behavior unpoliced in the employment
context.43 Krieger and Fiske suggest, for instance, that most courts
have now made explicit that any facially neutral basis for an employer’s decision will, if honestly although mistakenly or foolishly
held, suffice to defeat a claim of intentional discrimination under Title
VII.44 As Krieger and Fiske powerfully demonstrate, an “honest” concern about an employee may very often be both “honest” and (unbeknownst to the decisionmaker) entirely a product of the employee’s
status as an African-American worker.45
It is important not to overstate the point. In discrete corners of existing antidiscrimination law and policy, it is possible to find promising attempts to insulate outcomes from the effects of implicit bias.
Consider, for example, the affirmative action plans seen at all levels of
government.46 Such plans can illuminatingly be understood—in light
of the analysis of Jerry Kang and Mahzarin Banaji in this Symposium47—as attempts by the state to correct for implicit bias, and thus to
break the connection between such bias and outcomes. If, as Kang and

(stating that “the empirical literature on racial bias” suggests that
“most race-dependent governmental decisionmaking will elude equal
protection scrutiny”). For further discussion of many of these
critiques, see Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination Law’s Effects on
Implicit Bias (forthcoming 2006, Kluwer Academic Publishers).
43
See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 14.
44
See id.
45
See id.; see also Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification
Theory and Research: Implication for Legal Advocacy and Social
Justice, 94 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).
46
See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987);
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003).
47
See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral
Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2006). Kang and Banaji ultimately limit their analysis,
however, to specific forms of (what is conventionally regarded as)
affirmative action. See id.
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Banaji suggest, assessments of merit are inappropriately clouded by
implicit bias, then a preference for those harmed by the biased assessments can help prevent the implicit bias from being translated into final outcomes.48 If implicit bias typically leads an African-American
employee to be incorrectly evaluated as worse than a white counterpart, an appropriately tailored affirmative action plan can counteract
this mistake. And, likewise, antidiscrimination law’s framework for
assessing the legality of affirmative action plans can be understood as
enabling employers, educational institutions, and other organizations
to use such plans to break the connection between implicit bias and
outcomes, as Kang and Banaji also suggest.49
B. “Direct Debiasing”
In addition to the “insulating” strategies discussed in Part II.A, it
is often possible for government to target implicit bias more directly.
If decisionmakers, wholly without their intent and indeed to their great
chagrin, are acting on the basis of race or another protected trait, the
law may be able to help them to correct their unintended actions. Debiasing solutions reflect this approach, and we now turn to those solutions. Below we develop several illustrations of debiasing through
antidiscrimination law, as well as relating the general approach of debiasing through this body of law to work by others in this Symposium
and elsewhere in the legal literature.

48

See id. Ann McGinley and Michael Selmi have also discussed the
problem of implicit bias and noted that affirmative action is a way to
ensure that employment opportunities of protected groups do not
suffer as a result of such bias. See Ann C. McGinley, The Emerging
Cronyism Defense and Affirmative Action: A Critical Perspective on
the Distinction Between Colorblind and Race-Conscious Decision
Making Under Title VII, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1003, 1044-46, 1048-49
(1997); Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the
Affirmative Action Debate, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1284-89, 1297
(1995).
49
See Kang & Banaji, supra note 47.
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In the most obvious form of debiasing, antidiscrimination law either does or could act directly to reduce the level of people’s implicit
bias. Consider four examples of such “direct debiasing.”
1.

Prohibiting Consciously Biased Decisionmaking

The central focus of existing antidiscrimination law is on prohibiting consciously biased decisionmaking—a focus that has produced
intense criticism from those interested in implicit bias.50 Thus, it is
easy to overlook the way in which existing antidiscrimination law, despite its focus on conscious bias, nonetheless has some effect on the
level of implicit bias. A key causal path here is that the prohibition on
consciously biased decisionmaking in workplaces, educational institutions, and membership organizations naturally tends to increase population diversity in these entities, and population diversity in turn has a
significant effect on the level of implicit bias.51 Put differently, while
the prohibition on consciously biased behavior prompts a System II
response to the System II phenomenon of conscious bias, it also yields
a System I response to the System I phenomenon of implicit bias.
A significant body of social science evidence supports the conclusion that the presence of population diversity in an environment tends
to reduce the level of implicit bias.52 In one particularly striking study,

50

See sources cited supra note 42.
See Jolls, supra note 42.
52
Leading studies include Nilanjana Dasgupta & Shaki Asgari,
Seeing Is Believing: Exposure to Counterstereotypic Women Leaders
and Its Effect on the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotypes, 40
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 642, 651-52 (2004); Brian S.
Lowery, Curtis D. Hardin & Stacey Sinclair, Social Influence Effects
on Automatic Racial Prejudice, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
842, 844-45, 846-47 (2001); Jennifer A. Richeson & Nalini Ambady,
Effects of Situational Power on Automatic Racial Prejudice, 39 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 177, 179-81 (2003). Kang and Banaji
provide additional discussion of supportive evidence, including a
recent meta-study by Thomas Pettigrew and Linda Tropp. See Kang &
Banaji, supra note 47.
51
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the simple fact of administration of an in-person IAT by an AfricanAmerican rather than a white experimenter significantly reduced the
measured level of implicit bias.53 Put differently, people’s speed in
characterizing black-unpleasant and white-pleasant pairs was closer to
their speed in characterizing black-pleasant and white-unpleasant pairs
when the African-American experimenter was present. Another study
found that white test subjects paired with an African-American partner
exhibited less implicit bias as measured by the IAT than white test
subjects paired with a white partner; the same study found that within
pairs involving an African-American partner, participants who were
told they were to evaluate the African-American partner exhibited
more implicit racial bias on the IAT than participants who were told
they would be evaluated by the African-American partner.54
The effects of population diversity in the environment on the level
of implicit bias may stem from the availability heuristic discussed in
Part I; people often tend to assess probabilities based on whether a
relevant incidence comes easily to mind. The effects of diversity may
also reflect a more general role for the “affect heuristic,” by which decisions are formed by reference to rapid, intuitive, affective judgments.55
It follows from these findings that simply by increasing the level
of population diversity in workplaces, educational institutions, and
other organizations, existing antidiscrimination law almost certainly
tends to reduce the level of implicit bias in these environments.56 It
bears emphasis in this connection that antidiscrimination law’s clear
rejection of explicit quotas counters the risk that this law might paradoxically increase implicit bias by means of overly heavy-handed di-
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See Lowery, Hardin & Sinclair, supra note 52, at 844-45, 846-47.
See Richeson & Ambady, supra note 52, at 181 & tbl.1.
55
See Paul Slovic, Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters & Donald G.
MacGregor, The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra
note 16, at 397, 397-400.
56
See Jolls, supra note 42.
54
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versity initiatives.57 A closely related point is important: existing antidiscrimination law’s effects on implicit bias through increased population diversity may be greatest in cases in which people’s initial levels
of implicit bias represent errors in judgment as opposed to statistically
accurate perceptions. As discussed in Part I above, implicit bias, like
the heuristics and biases emphasized in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, may often reflect a genuine factual error; but of
course this may not always be the case. If implicit bias corresponds to
statistically accurate perceptions about the group in question, then the
effects of population diversity may be muted by conflicting signals
corresponding to the statistical reality.
2.

Prohibiting Hostile Environments

Existing antidiscrimination law’s prohibition on “hostile environments” is also likely to reduce the level of implicit bias in workplaces, educational institutions, and other organizations, here through
its effect on the physical and sensory environment.58 Again, what is
generally viewed as a System II response to a System II problem is
also a System I response to a System I problem.

57

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(j) (2000) (“Nothing contained in
[Title VII] shall be interpreted to require any employer . . . to grant
preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group
on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total
number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin employed by any employer . . . in comparison with the
total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in
the available work force in any community, State, section, or other
area.”). For discussion of the ways in which some types of explicit
preferential treatment of particular groups can increase bias against
these groups, see Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika:
Intergroup Relations after Affirmative Action, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1251,
1263-70 (1998).
58
See Jolls, supra note 42.

20

Both evidence and common sense suggest that the presence of
stereotypic images of a particular group tends to increase implicit
bias.59 A particularly striking study, outside the direct context of measures of implicit bias, found that men who had viewed a pornographic
film just before being interviewed by a woman remembered little
about the interviewer other than her physical characteristics—while
men who had watched a regular film before the interview had meaningful recall of the content of the interview.60 Heuristics such as availability and affect may again be in play.61
Under current antidiscrimination law, hostile environments featuring negative or demeaning depictions of protected groups are generally unlawful in workplaces, educational institutions, and membership
organizations.62 In this way, current law governing sexual and racial
harassment almost certainly produces some effect on the level of implicit bias in these institutions.63 Compared to an environment in which
such demeaning depictions were not unlawful, the current framework
is likely to have a debiasing effect.
The prohibition on hostile environments may be felt throughout
the organization, not merely by those directly targeted by the behavior.
The law does not simply protect an immediate victim or set of victims
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See, e.g., Irene V. Blair, Jennifer E. Ma & Alison P. Lenton,
Imagining Stereotypes Away: The Moderation of Implicit Stereotypes
Through Mental Imagery, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL 828,
832-33 (2001).
60
See Doug McKenzie-Mohr & Mark P. Zanna, Treating Women as
Sexual Objects: Look to the (Gender Schematic) Male Who Has
Viewed Pornography, 16 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 296,
303-04 (1990), discussed in Jolls, supra note 42.
61
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
62
See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (workplace
environment under Title VII); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ.,
526 U.S. 629 (1999) (school environment under Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972); Minn. Stat. §363A.11 subd. 1
(2005) (voluntary organization environment under state law).
63
See Jolls, supra note 42.
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from behavior deemed to be unlawful; instead the law tends to shape
and affect the level of implicit bias of all those present. Of course, the
law does not target people’s beliefs as such; the point is that in proscribing certain conduct it undoubtedly has an effect on the level of
implicit bias.64
3.

The Requirements for Employers Seeking to Avoid Vicarious
Liability

A third example of a direct debiasing mechanism involves potential reforms of the existing doctrine governing employers’ vicarious
liability for Title VII violations. At present that doctrine allows employers to defend against such liability on the basis of actions such as
manuals or training videos disseminated in the workplace.65
Just as there are biasing effects (described just above) from negative imagery in the physical environment, there is strong evidence of
debiasing effects from favorable portraiture or imagery—for instance,
photographs of Tiger Woods—in the physical environment.66 People
show significantly less bias on the IAT in the presence of Woods’s
picture—and also when tested again twenty-four hours after exposure
to the picture.67 Thus, in the real world, if portraiture in the workplace
or elsewhere consistently reflects positive exemplars, it is likely—
though certainly not guaranteed68—that those present will show less
implicit bias, with likely mechanisms once more being the availability
and affect heuristics.69
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See id.
See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Kolsted
v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
66
See Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the
Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice
with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 803-04 (2001).
67
See id.
68
See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 5 (raising caution about
longer term effects of positive imagery).
69
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
65
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Note that in contrast to the experimental setting, positive exemplars in the workplace or elsewhere would be a recurrent rather than
fleeting aspect of the individual’s environment. And, as above, the
manner in which the display of positive exemplars occurs is important;
if it is too heavy-handed, implicit bias may not decrease at all (and
could even increase).70
In light of the available evidence, it may make a good deal of
sense to treat an employer’s positive effort to portray diversity as an
express factor weighing against vicarious employer liability under Title VII. This approach would be parallel to the way that, under current
Title VII doctrine, employers regularly defend against such liability on
the basis of actions such as manuals or training videos disseminated in
the workplace.71 Our basic suggestion is that the existing Title VII approach to employers’ vicarious liability might be extended beyond the
discrete mechanisms (manuals, handbooks, videos, internet instructional programs) contemplated by present law—at least if doing so is
consistent with the First Amendment (a question beyond the scope of
the present discussion). While many of the mechanisms contemplated
by present law governing vicarious liability are distinctly System II in
character, the evidence suggests the important role of System I mechanisms in reducing implicit bias. The display of positive exemplars in
the work place may do far more to reduce implicit bias than yet another mandatory training session on workplace diversity.
4.

Affirmative Action Policy

Existing affirmative action policy can also be understood as a
form of direct debiasing. We have already noted that at all levels of
government, officials have chosen to adopt affirmative action plans.72
Because population diversity helps to reduce implicit bias through
mechanisms including availability and affect (as described above),
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See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
See sources cited supra note 65.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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these government affirmative action plans may operate as a form of
direct debiasing.73
To be sure, government affirmative action may fail to debias people—and might even increase implicit bias depending on a given
plan’s specific contours. Krieger, while noting how affirmative action
may reduce bias,74 has explored the possible negative effects of affirmative action on the level of bias with reference to the existing social science literature,75 and the question of whether and when such
negative effects will occur is obviously a crucial one. From the standpoint of reducing implicit bias, the good news is that the empirical
studies discussed above highlight the potential of increased diversity
to reduce implicit bias, while the evidence discussed by Krieger provides many insights on the specific types of affirmative action plans
that do and do not appear to have negative effects on the level of
bias.76
Our analysis of affirmative action here differs from Kang and Banaji’s insulating analysis of affirmative action, discussed in Part II.A
above. In the conception here, government affirmative action does not
act to insulate outcomes from the effects of implicit bias but, instead,
acts directly to reduce such bias.77 Of course, a government affirmative
action plan may have both types of effects simultaneously.
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See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law
(unpublished manuscript, Yale Legal Theory Workshop, Dec. 4,
2003).
74
See Krieger, supra note 57, at 1275-76.
75
See id. at 1263-70.
76
See id.
77
Analyses of affirmative action and implicit bias in the existing
legal literature have often not been specific about which sort of
mechanism—“insulating” or “debiasing” in our terms—produces the
effect of an affirmative action plan; both mechanisms may be
contemplated. See, e.g., Michael J. Yelnosky, The Prevention
Justification for Affirmative Action, 64 OHIO ST. L. J. 1385, 1395-96
(2003); cf. Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace,
Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 7, 26-29, 77-94 (2000)
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Let us offer a concluding comment about all of the methods of
direct debiasing explored in this section. Uniting all of these methods
is the general idea that government does or might act against implicit
bias using System I rather than System II mechanisms. The direct debiasing approaches described here thus mark a substantial departure
from alternative efforts focused on “deliberate ‘mental correction’ that
takes group status squarely into account.”78 We discuss normative issues arising out of this System I–System II difference in Part III below.
C. “Indirect Debiasing”
We now turn to mechanisms for what we call “indirect debiasing”—mechanisms that receive sustained and insightful treatment in
this Symposium in the work by Linda Hamilton Krieger and Susan
Fiske and the work by Jerry Kang and Mahzarin Banaji.79 Under indirect debiasing mechanisms, law prohibits or permits certain behavior
and, as an indirect result of the prohibition or permission, creates incentives (or avoids disincentives) for regulated actors to adopt a debiasing approach. We consider two examples.
1.

A Prohibition on Implicitly Biased Behavior?

Many scholars suggest that existing antidiscrimination law does
little to police implicitly biased behavior.80 A variety of proposed reforms, including those proposed by Krieger and Fiske in this Sympo-

(discussing how population diversity from affirmative action may
reduce various forms of bias including conscious bias, but expressing
pessimism about the possibility of altering implicit bias).
78
See Krieger, supra note 57, at 1279.
79
Krieger & Fiske, supra note 14; Kang & Banaji, supra note 47.
80
See sources cited supra note 42.
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sium, would broaden the reach of antidiscrimination law in addressing
that behavior.81
It is obvious that if antidiscrimination law were to proscribe implicitly biased behavior in an effective manner, the law would encourage employers to adopt mechanisms to reduce implicit bias.
(Obviously, the greater the translation of implicit bias to implicitly biased behavior, the greater the incentive for employers.) Following the
discussion above, such mechanisms could include population diversity
in the organization (Parts II.B.1 and II.B.4) and careful attention to
depictions of protected groups in the physical environment (Parts
II.B.2 and II.B.3). The discussion above described how those steps
tend to reduce the level of implicit bias.
Alternatively, effective prohibition of implicitly biased behavior
could encourage employers to adopt general decisionmaking structures
or processes that reduce the intensity and frequency of implicit bias,
implicitly biased behavior, or both. In the words of one commentator,
steps may include “creating interdependence among in-group and outgroup members, providing structure and guidance for appraisal and
evaluation, and making decisionmakers accountable for their decisions.”82 It is unclear whether the mechanisms in play here will be predominantly System I or System II in nature. In a related vein, Susan
Sturm has recounted how major accounting firm offices came to recognize and address sex-based disparities in assignments through the
simple step of having the office managing partners list the nature and
quantity of assignments to employees by sex.83 (They were very sur-
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See, e.g., Flagg, supra note 42, at 991-1017; Krieger, supra note
4, at 1186-1217, 1241-44; Krieger & Fiske, supra note 14; Lawrence,
supra note 42, at 355-81; Poirier, supra note 29, at 478-91; Saujani,
supra note 42, at 413-18.
82
Green, supra note 13, at 147. Green also notes, consistent with the
previous paragraph, that employers might seek to construct
“heterogeneous work and decisionmaking groups.” See id.
83
Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 496 (2001).
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prised by the simple fact that there were significant disparities in assignments by sex.)
It is reasonable to suppose that steps such as these would reduce
the underlying level of implicit bias as well as implicitly biased behavior; if so, then the law’s inducement of employers to adopt such steps
is an illustration of indirect debiasing. But such steps may in some
cases simply insulate outcomes from the effects of an underlying level
of implicit bias, in which case they are insulating rather than debiasing
approaches within our framework.
We do not take a position here on the relative effectiveness of the
many diverse means by which employers might seek to reduce implicit
bias, implicitly biased behavior, or both in response to effective prohibition of implicitly biased behavior. It is uncertain whether approaches
centered in System II would do much to reduce the phenomena; so too,
the potential limits on some of the System I approaches were explored
in Part II.B above. Here we simply highlight the likelihood that muchdiscussed reform efforts with respect to policing implicitly biased behavior would produce responses that, in turn, would tend to reduce the
level of implicit bias.
2.

The Legal Treatment of Affirmative Action Plans

A second example of an indirect debiasing mechanism is the legal
treatment of affirmative action plans. We have emphasized that government might engage in direct debiasing through the adoption of such
plans. It follows that in tolerating such plans (whether imposed by
public or by private actors), the law is engaging in a form of indirect
debiasing; that is, regulated actors are permitted to take steps that, in
turn, tend to reduce implicit bias.
Kang and Banaji argue in this Symposium that a proper interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII would allow employers to engage in affirmative action in order to produce a diverse
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workforce and thereby reduce implicit bias.84 Importantly, Kang and
Banaji explain that these forms of affirmative action are distinct from
the “role model” arguments that have met with mixed reception in the
courts; in the debiasing approach, the emphasis is on the attitudes and
behavior of those outside, rather than within, the traditionally underrepresented group.85
To clarify, the emphasis in the present discussion is on creating
legal structures within which actors may choose to adopt debiasing
mechanisms; by contrast, our discussion in Part II.B.4 above involved
the affirmative choice by the state to adopt such mechanisms itself. In
our terminology, the state engages in direct debiasing when it chooses
to adopt an affirmative action plan that directly reduces implicit bias.
By contrast, the state can be said engage in indirect debiasing when it
enables actors (including government itself) to adopt such affirmative
action plans. In one case, the legal policy itself debiases, while in the
other case the legal policy provides a space in which regulated actors
may adopt debiasing mechanisms. Of course, insofar as government
affirmative action plans are concerned, both types of debiasing will be
in play.
D. Summary
In a variety of ways, existing law and policy seek to respond to
the problem of implicit bias; imaginable reforms could do far more.
Some strategies focus on insulating outcomes from the effects of implicit bias, which itself is taken largely as a given. But many actual
and imaginable legal approaches instead act to reduce implicit bias.
Such effects occur directly when the law requires steps that tend to
reduce implicit bias (Part II.B). They occur indirectly when the law
encourages or enables regulated actors to craft steps that, in turn, re-
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Kang & Banaji, supra note 47. For an initial discussion of the
idea that legal policy in the form of government affirmative action
reduces implicit bias through increased population diversity, see Jolls
& Sunstein, supra note 73.
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See Kang & Banaji, supra note 47.
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duce implicit bias (Part II.C). Table 1 provides a summary of these
alternative approaches.
Note that while our focus throughout is on the law’s role in debiasing in response to implicit bias, private individuals may act, apart
from law, in an effort to debias themselves.86 Such steps represent
nonlegal alternatives to the problem of implicit bias. For purposes of
legal scholarship, however, the central question, and the question emphasized in Table 1, is the role of law in combating implicit bias.
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See id.

29

Table 1: Debiasing and Other Legal Responses to Implicit Bias

Insulating Mechanisms: Law or policy
insulates outcomes
from the effects of
implicit bias

1) Existing government affirmative action policies’
overriding of “merit”
evaluations that will
tend to be implicitly
biased (Part II.A)87

Type of Law
Direct Debiasing
Mechanisms: Specific legal or policy
requirements directly reduce implicit bias
1) Existing antidiscrimination law’s
prohibition on consciously biased behavior and resulting
positive effect on
workplace, educational, or other diversity (Part II.B.1)88

87

Indirect Debiasing
Mechanisms: Law
encourages or enables regulated actors to take steps
that reduce implicit
bias
1) Existing antidiscrimination law’s
prohibition on implicitly biased behavior (to the extent
such a prohibition
exists) or extension
of existing antidiscrimination law’s
prohibitions to cover
implicitly biased behavior (Part II.C.1)

This argument follows directly from the discussion in id.; in
McGinley, supra note 48, at 1044-46, 1048-49; and in Selmi, supra
note 48, at 1284-89, 1297.
88
See Jolls, supra note 42.
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Table 1 (cont.): Debiasing and Other Legal Responses to Implicit
Bias

Insulating Mechanisms: Law or policy
insulates outcomes
from the effects of
implicit bias

2) Antidiscrimination
law’s framework for
assessing the legality
of affirmative action
policies; these policies may override
“merit” evaluations
that will tend to be
implicitly biased
(Part II.A)89

Type of Law
Direct Debiasing
Mechanisms: Specific legal or policy
requirements directly reduce implicit bias
2) Existing antidiscrimination law’s
prohibition on hostile workplace, educational, or other
environments (Part
II.B.2)90

3) Extension of existing antidiscrimination law to require
employers seeking
to avoid vicarious
liability to foster diversity in the physical environment
(Part II.B.3)

89
90
91

See Kang & Banaji, supra note 47.
See Jolls, supra note 42.
See Kang & Banaji, supra note 47.
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Indirect Debiasing
Mechanisms: Law
encourages or enables regulated actors to take steps
that reduce implicit
bias
2) Antidiscrimination law’s framework for assessing
the legality of affirmative action
policies; these policies may encourage
employers to adopt
diversity-oriented
hiring practices that
reduce implicit bias
(Part II.C.2) 91

Table 1 (cont.): Debiasing and Other Legal Responses
to Implicit Bias

Insulating Mechanisms: Law or policy
insulates outcomes
from the effects of
implicit bias

Type of Law
Direct Debiasing
Mechanisms: Specific legal or policy
requirements directly reduce implicit bias

Indirect Debiasing
Mechanisms: Law
encourages or enables regulated actors to take steps
that reduce implicit
bias

4) Existing state affirmative action
policies’ positive
effect on workplace,
educational, or other
diversity (Part
II.B.4)92

E. Debiasing of Whom?
In the various debiasing interventions discussed above, the presumed targets of the debiasing were actors at risk of displaying implicit bias or implicitly biased behavior toward members of a protected
group. But the contribution of Gary Blasi and John Jost to this Symposium illustrates that such behavior is only one part of a complete
analysis. As Blasi and Jost describe, those who are victims of implicitly biased behavior may often accept and even justify, rather than object to, such behavior—a manifestation of the broader phenomenon of
“system justification.”93 In our view, Blasi and Jost should be understood to be supplementing a great deal of work that explores the gen-
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See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 73.
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eral possibility of “adaptive preferences”—preferences that have
adapted to existing injustice.94
In the employment context, for example, George Akerlof and
Robert Dickens argue that employees may fail to confront the real
magnitude of occupational risks, simply because it is so distressing to
do so.95 Speaking in broader terms, Amartya Sen has long emphasized
that “deprived people . . . may even adjust their desires and expectations to what they unambitiously see as feasible.”96 Describing the hierarchical nature of pre-Revolutionary America, historian Gordon
Wood writes that those “in lowly stations . . . developed what was
called a ‘down look,’” and “knew their place and willingly walked
while gentlefolk rode; and as yet they seldom expressed any burning
desire to change places with their betters.”97 In Wood’s account, it is
impossible to “comprehend the distinctiveness of that premodern
world until we appreciate the extent to which many ordinary people
still accepted their own lowliness.”98 If Blasi and Jost are right, then
the modern world is not entirely different from its premodern counterpart.
In addition to the general evidence that they muster, the results of
the IAT itself provide some support for system justification. As we
noted above, a significant number (roughly half) of African-Americans
show the same implicit racial bias on the IAT as whites.99
In this light, an important potential benefit of the debiasing approaches described above is that they may reduce levels of implicit
bias in victims as well as perpetrators of implicitly biased behavior. If,
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for example, population diversity reduces implicit bias among those
present—whatever their particular group—then such diversity should
not only reduce implicitly biased behavior by perpetrators, but also
increase resistance to such behavior by victims. Likewise, if avoiding
sexually explicit visual displays in the workplace reduces levels of implicit sex stereotyping among women as well as men, then avoiding
such displays may affect women’s, as well as men’s, behavior. Debiasing victims is undoubtedly a massive issue for law and policy. Our
suggestion here is that many efforts to debias perpetrators help simultaneously to counteract the problem that Blasi and Jost explore in this
Symposium.
III.
Normative Questions
The central emphasis of Part II was the way in which antidiscrimination law and policy either does or could act to reduce implicit
bias. While the analysis thus far has been purely descriptive, these
sorts of debiasing strategies raise important normative questions. Consideration of those questions turns out to be importantly assisted by the
parallels from in Part I between implicit bias and the heuristics and
biases emphasized in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics.
A. Thought Control?
No doubt the most obvious normative question raised by legal attempts to reduce people’s implicit bias is whether such debiasing
strategies amount to objectionable government “thought control.”
Like the other contributors to this Symposium, we believe that implicit
bias is a serious problem and that it is exceedingly important for the
law to attempt to address implicitly biased behavior. Often, as noted
above, the most plausible responses to the problem of implicit bias
will be legal steps that reduce such bias. But any use of the law to this
end raises immediate normative questions. Is it appropriate for government to seek to shape how people think about their coworkers or
fellow students?
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In many domains, some government control over what people
think is simply unavoidable. Illustrations from current law, outside of
the antidiscrimination context, are easily imagined. Whenever the government is so much as presenting information to people in response to
factual misjudgments, government is making decisions about the manner of presentation, and these choices inevitably will affect how its
citizens perceive the world around them.100 But in the domain of civil
rights addressed in this Symposium, it may be difficult to disentangle
factual mistakes in judgment—where changing what people think is
common and frequently unobjectionable in a wide range of domains101—from genuine preferences and values with which government may have no business engaging. While government, on this
view, may be entitled to discourage conduct based on such preferences
and values, it might well seem illegitimate for it to seek to alter the
preferences and values themselves.
We emphasize two main points here. First, it is plainly unobjectionable for government to act in response to factual errors; if people
are simply mistaken as a matter of fact in associating a particular trait
or attribute with members of one race, attempts at government correction do not raise especially profound issues. Information campaigns,
either for risk regulation or for antidiscrimination law, are not objectionable in principle.102 Our discussion in Part I suggested how implicit
bias may sometimes be akin to a factual error. If implicit bias leads
people to make such errors in assessing others, then the government
may legitimately seek to correct those errors.
Second, it is equally unobjectionable for government to ban many
forms of biased behavior—whether consciously biased or implicitly
biased—even if one effect of the ban is to alter people’s values and
preferences. Of course, this suggestion does not mean that government
may use the force of law to target beliefs rather than behavior—even if
the beliefs are targeted as a way of preventing behavior. Suppose, for
example, that a workplace features demeaning pictures and jokes that
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are likely to increase both implicit bias and implicitly biased behavior
against female employees or students. Suppose then that regulators
attempt to eliminate those pictures and jokes because of their likely
negative effects; perhaps regulators are aware that relevant conditions
will likely activate System I, in a way that has concrete effects on
women in the workplace. It is not unreasonable to see a problem with
regulating speech (posters and jokes) on the ground that it is likely to
lead to biased behavior.
There is, however, another possibility, rooted most obviously in
our discussion of hostile environment liability in Part II.B.2 above. In
some circumstances, workplace practices (such as posters and jokes)
that are likely to produce biased behavior are themselves independently a form of unlawful discrimination. Suppose, for example, that
demeaning pictures and jokes are pervasive in a certain workplace, in
a way that creates a hostile environment for women. As described
above, the pictures and jokes are then directly targeted as unlawful under existing antidiscrimination law. If there were a compelling concern
with government “thought control” under this law, one would naturally expect successful challenges to it under the First Amendment, but
in fact the standard view is that the legal prohibition here is consistent
with First Amendment principles.103 As this example illustrates, the
law tolerates some government prohibitions on discriminatory behavior, even when they relate directly to speech, despite their potential
effects on people’s values and preferences.
We do not mean in this space to settle all of the dimensions of the
“thought control” objection to government efforts to reduce implicit
bias. But this much is clear. The normative problems are least severe
when government is counteracting either factual mistakes or discriminatory behavior such as hostile work environments; and if efforts to
combat such forms of biased behavior also reduce implicit bias, no one
should complain in light of existing law.

103

See, e.g., J. M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 2304-06 (1999); Richard H. Fallon Jr., Sexual
Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog That
Didn’t Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 21-51.

36

One final point. Many people are both surprised and embarrassed
to find that they show implicit bias, and their bias conflicts with their
explicit judgments and their moral commitments.104 As we have suggested, it is likely to be the case that some people engage in biased behavior inadvertently or despite their own ideals. Such people want, in
a sense, to be debiased, but their own conscious efforts are at most a
partial help. Many normative objections to debiasing strategies, as
forms of objectionable government meddling, are weakened to the extent that such strategies help people to remove implicit bias that they
themselves reject on principle.
B. Heterogeneous Actors
Without more, the “thought control” concerns discussed above
might, for some, argue in favor of insulating over debiasing strategies
when insulating approaches—which do not seek to alter people’s underlying level of bias—are feasible. However, insulating approaches
lack a key advantage of debiasing strategies: debiasing often has the
virtue of avoiding significant effects on those who do not exhibit bias
in the first place.105
Recall our earlier illustration of consumer optimism bias; government, believing that consumers often underestimate the likelihood
of injury from risky products, restricts consumer choice in a variety of
ways.106 Such restrictions introduce new distortions in outcomes for
those who did not err in the first instance, as products are banned,
more expensive, or otherwise less available to them. By contrast, debiasing techniques are likely to affect those who are biased without
much affecting those who are not.107 So too in the context of antidiscrimination law: debiasing approaches target implicit bias for reduc-
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tion and thus are unlikely to affect those who initially do not show implicit bias.108
To illustrate the basic point here, return to the alternative analyses
of government affirmative action plans in Part II above. One analysis
emphasizes insulation. On this account, affirmative action plans may
protect outcomes from the effects of implicit bias—itself taken as a
given—by granting discrete preferences to members of a particular
group.109 Here, as applied to a particular decisionmaker who in fact
harbors no implicit bias, the government’s action will introduce a distortion in, rather than a corrective to, decisionmaking; depending on
the nature of the affirmative action plan the alteration may be significant.110 If a given decisionmaker evaluates an African-American in a
wholly unbiased fashion but the candidate nonetheless receives a
thumb on the scale under an affirmative action plan, then the plan
causes, rather than insulates against, raced-based decisionmaking.
The analysis differs with respect to the debiasing account of affirmative action. On this account, affirmative action, by increasing
population diversity, may reduce implicit bias—but there is no reason
to think the increased population diversity will significantly alter the
views of those who did not show implicit bias in the first place. The
perceptions of a decisionmaker who already has no trouble envisioning
African-Americans in authority roles are unlikely to move substantially in response to increased population diversity in the organization.
Of course empirical testing would be important to verify this conjecture, but debiasing solutions at least hold out the possibility of leaving
unaffected or less affected the decisionmaking of those who were not
biased in the first instance. The use of a System I response to a System
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I problem may be able to leave relatively untouched those not exhibiting the System I problem in the first instance.111
The system justification context discussed above provides another
example of the potential advantage of debiasing approaches. Consider
the suggestion of Blasi and Jost that, as a result of system justification
tendencies, victims of biased behavior will often not mount legal challenges to such behavior.112 If so, one could imagine responding with
policies greatly lowering the legal barriers to bringing such challenges.
But such steps would naturally tend to affect the frequency of legal
challenges even outside the set of cases in which system justification
was depressing legal challenges in the first instance. Again, debiasing
strategies may avoid such distortions in the behavior of those not exhibiting bias in the first instance.
IV.
Conclusion
Antidiscrimination law, no less than any other area of law, should
be based on a realistic understanding of human behavior. If consumers
underreact to certain risks, the law should take their underreactions
into account. And if individuals act on the basis of implicit bias
against African-Americans or other groups, without awareness that
they are doing so, the law should seek to respond, if only because
similarly situated people are not being treated similarly. As in riskrelated behavior, so too with implicitly biased behavior: System I, involving rapid, intuitive responses, is often responsible for people’s behavior, and it can lead them badly astray.
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We have suggested the importance of distinguishing between two
responses to implicit bias. Sometimes the legal system does and should
pursue a strategy of insulation—for example, by protecting consumers
against their own mistakes or by banning or otherwise limiting the effects of implicitly biased behavior. But sometimes the legal system
does and should attempt to debias those who suffer from consumer
error—or who might treat people in a biased manner. In many domains, debiasing strategies provide a preferable and less intrusive solution. In the context of antidiscrimination law, implicit bias presents a
particularly severe challenge; we have suggested that several existing
doctrines now operate to reduce that bias, either directly or indirectly,
and that these existing doctrines do not on that account run into convincing normative objections.
It is now clear that implicit bias is widespread, and it is increasingly apparent that actual behavior is often affected by it, in violation
of the principles that underlie antidiscrimination law. The question for
the future, illuminatingly explored by the contributors to this Symposium, is how the law might better deal with that problem.
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